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Abstract 
 
The radical right has established themselves as permanent actors in the European 
party system over the last decade. The determinant factors explaining their 
increased electoral success have been thoroughly researched. Despite this fact the 
knowledge of their policy impact is largely unknown. This thesis argues that the 
local level in Sweden offers unique opportunity to study the policy impact of the 
radical right as refugee reception is decided by the municipal councils. In addition 
the use of municipalities as units of study bypasses the usual issue of comparing 
across different context and institutional arrangements. By theoretically 
differentiating between direct and indirect policy impact this study aims at 
exploring under which circumstances the radical right has the ability to change 
policy. With the use of TSCS-analysis this thesis find support for two scenarios in 
which the SD negatively affect the level of refugee reception in Swedish 
municipalities; when they hold the balance of power and when local right-wing 
coalition representatives have tough view on refugee reception. The results 
indicate that the SD has direct policy impact through collaboration with the 
mainstream parties or indirect through policy co-optation by right-wing parties. 
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1 Introduction 
The most successful new member of the post-war western-European party family 
is the populist radical right (Mudde 2013). These parties share an authoritarian 
and nativist agenda which stir up feelings and create new lines of political conflict 
all over Europe. Europe is taking a “right turn” according to some commentators 
(Bale 2008; Schulz 2011). The research trying to explain how and why these 
parties have been able to break the freezing of Europe’s party system is vast 
(Mudde 2007). But one question has not been answered fruitfully have the 
populist radical right had any impact on European politics (Bolin et.al 2014; 
Mudde 2013)? 
 
Sweden is the stage on which the latest emergence of a radical right party took 
place with the breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats (SD). The party had a 
national breakthrough in the 2010 election gaining 5.7% of the votes. In the 2014 
election the party became the third largest party in the national parliament with a 
total of 12.9% of the votes. Since their breakthrough in 2010 there has been a 
general consensus among the mainstream parties to isolate the SD from any 
influence. On a local level this may be an impossible task as the SD gained as 
over 20 % of the votes in several of the Swedish municipal councils.
 1
 Swedish 
municipal councils offer a unique case to study the policy impact of the SD as the 
level of refugee acceptance is a question for the local governments in Sweden. 
Although the SD is not a single-issue party nativist policies are the focal point of 
their political existence (Erlingsson et al. 2014). If the SD has had any policy 
impact it is most likely in a policy such as refugee reception. The 290 municipal 
councils in Sweden thus constitute a great opportunity to study the policy impact 
of the SD. The research question in the center of this thesis is: 
 
 Has the SD affected the level of refugee reception in Swedish municipalities? 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine if the SD has had any impact on policy in 
Swedish municipalities. Local refugee acceptance will be the policy studied since 
it is a question in the hands of the municipal council and the fact that it is an issue 
closely linked to the SD and other radical right parties (Mudde 1999).  
                                                 
1
 See http://www.val.se/sprak/engelska/index.html for election results. 
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2 Theory 
2.1 Policy impact 
This section aims at building a theoretical framework in order to understand how 
new parties, especially radical right parties (such as the SD), can influence policy. 
Policy impact is usually understood in terms of direct- and indirect impact. Schain 
(2009) defines direct policy impact as “policy making capabilities”, in other 
terms, gaining the capability to influence policy directly (i.e. by voting) in 
institutions such as national or subnational parliaments. Direct policy impact is in 
this thesis defined as being an active part of successful policy formation. New 
political actors can influence policy indirectly in a number of ways such as 
portraying an issue in a new fashion thus increasing its importance on the agenda 
or shifting the preference of mainstream parties (Bale 2008; Camus 2011; 
Kingdon 2011). The following section will shed a light on the different ways in 
which new actors can impact policy, directly and indirectly. 
 
The rise of the radical right in Europe have put pressure on the traditionally very 
solid party system in Europe and the mainstream parties have been forced to deal 
with the new contenders in one way or an other. Mainstream parties have to 
decide whether or not they wish to engage radical right parties at all. This initial 
choice can be seen as part of a larger strategy that limits or grants the radical right 
policy making capabilities. The radical right can be ignored or isolated if the 
mainstream parties choose to disengage them. If they on the other hand decide to 
engage them they can either collaborate or co-opt their policies in an effort not to 
lose voters to the radical right (Downs 2001).  
 
Figure 1:  Mainstream party reaction to the radical right 
 
 
 
 
  
Disengage 
Engage 
Ignore 
Isolate 
Co-opt policy 
Collaborate 
Comments: Source: (Downs 2001).  
 3 
 
If the radical right is disengaged by the mainstream parties their chance of direct 
policy impcat is limited. Logically, if the radical right is being ignored or isolated 
they have no chance of changing policy in the parliament. Isolation can be 
achieved either legal or political means. Legal restrictions of isolation can be to 
outlaw a specific party or increasing the electral threshold to keep new actors out. 
This strategy along with ignoration is generally seen as democraticlly dubios thus, 
political isolation is more common (Downs 2001). A cordon sanitarie is the the 
usual strategy employmed by mainstream parites in order to politically isolate 
radical right parties. By cooprating in a “blocking” or “grand” coalition 
mainstream parties can ensure that the radical right do not gain any direct policy 
making capabilities (Downs 2001; Schain 2009). The risk with the use of grand 
coalitions is the potetial ideological convergence among the mainstream parties 
creating long term political opportunity structures for the radical right (Arzheimer 
and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1997, 2007). 
 
If mainstream parties choose to engage the radical right there are two strategies 
which can be utilized; policy co-optatition or collaration (Downs 2001). A party 
which has lost voters to the radical right can choose to take a change their stance 
in certain policy questions with the goal to reattract the lost voters. The final 
strategy which can be used by mainstream parties when reacting to radical right 
parties is to collaborate with them. Collaboration can occur in parliament or in 
government. Collaboration is the only way in which the radical right is given 
direct policy making capabilites unless they gain a majority by considering the 
definition used in this study. In figure 2 below the different outcomes of the 
strategies  decibed is illustrated. 
 
Figure 2: Mainstream party strategy and policy decision 
 
Comments:  The figure illustrates a spatial model of legislation, coalition (a) & (b) and a radical right party (rr) 
and their respective preferred positions (ticks) on a policy preference line. Source: (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). 
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Figure 2 illustrates the various policy outcomes that can occur depending on the 
strategies employed by mainstream parties. The figure displays a simplified 
scenario in which two coalitions (a and b) reacts to a radical right party (rr) that 
enters the party system. The actors’ preferences are displayed by their positions on 
the preference line. Scenario (A) is an illustration of a political isolation, the 
formation of a cordon sanitarie, where the two coalitions decide to cooperate in 
order to shut out the radical right party; this is illustrated by rr’s remoteness to the 
policy decision on the preference line. The result is a policy decision the radical 
right party has no direct way of impacting. An empirical example of this is the 
Swedish general migration agreement from 2011. The former Swedish rightwing 
minority government decided to collaborate with the green party (MP) in order to 
reach a general agreement in the area of migration, in other words, the mainstream 
parties decided to cooperate in a cordon sanitarie to shut out the radical right 
party (SD) from any influence in the decision (Regeringen 2011).  
 
Scenario (B) illustrates the policy outcome of collaboration between coalition b 
and the radical right party (rr). By collaborating the radical right is given direct 
policy impact. An empirical example of this scenario is the Danish people’s 
party’s (DFP) support of the Conservative-Liberal coalition government following 
the 2001 Danish election. The government lead by the Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen (Venstre) was supported by the DPP in exchange for policy 
impact in areas such as immigration policy (Akkerman and de Lange 2013). 
 
The third scenario (C) illustrated in figure 2 displays the change in policy 
preference in actor b when the co-optation strategy is employed in order to woo 
back lost voters (or attract new). If a party changes its views on a specific issue 
and alters its policies in order to (re)attract voters the radical right exhibits indirect 
policy impact, in the form of policy co-optation by mainstream parties. This 
process is at large referred to as the verrechtsing thesis in the literature (Mudde 
2013). The idea of mainstream parties taking a right turn is thoroughly theorized 
and highly debated. Some claim only right-wing parties have changed their policy 
preferences as a consequence to the rise of the radical right (Camus 2011; Schain 
2006) while some argue that the whole political spectrum has taken a right turn 
(van Spanje 2010).  
 
As mentioned above, the radical right is only deemed as having the potential of 
direct policy impact in the case of collaboration (unless they have a majority in a 
parliamentary setting on their own), scenario (B). The empirical cases of the 
radical right parties being in a position where they can directly influence policy in 
Europe (as a member of government of formally supporting a minority 
government) can be counted on two hands. In fact, up until 2012 this had only 
occurred seven times in Western Europe, twice in Austria and Denmark and one 
time in Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Akkerman & de Lange 2012). The 
extent of their direct policy impact when given the opportunity is linked to the 
capability of the radical right party. Radical right parties with a solid organization 
and professional and capable representatives have the tools in place to more 
effectively impact policy. DFP in Denmark and the Freedom Party of Austria 
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(FPÖ) is seen as examples of well-functioning parties that were able to impact 
policy to their favor. Their counterparts in Italy and Switzerland is an example of 
the opposite, they had close to no impact on policy, scholars attribute this to their 
lacking organization and capability (Akkerman & de Lange 2012; Art 2011).  
Despite the instances of potential direct policy impact being so few, the impact of 
the radical right has according to many scholars been widespread across Europe, 
in other terms;  most of the impact of the radical right has been indirect (Mudde 
2013). The following section examines the different ways in which the radical 
right can indirectly influence policy.  
 
The verrechtsing thesis described briefly on the previous page is arguably the 
most studied form of indirect policy impact (Bale 2008; Camus 2011; Schain 
2006; van Spanje 2010; Mudde 2013, 2007). The argument is that some (or most) 
party families in Europe have taken a right turn as a response to the rise of the 
radical right. As a part of the co-optation strategy parties have adopted policy 
positions closer to the radical right in order to woo back lost voters.  
 
The increased competition caused by the mere existence of the radical right and 
thus their ability to affect the agenda can be seen as a part of the verrechsting 
arguably seen in Europe. Agenda setting is a crucial term in case of policy reform 
and political change in general and should be seen as a way towards indirect 
policy impact through co-optation of policy (Minkenberg 2011; Kingdon 2011; 
Pierson 2004). The radical right has with their increased electoral success been 
able to push to put the immigration question further up on the agenda in Europe 
forcing parties to address nativist policies in order to keep voters (Minkenberg 
2011). In 2014 33% of the Swedish voters thought that refugees and immigration 
had a very large importance when deciding who they should give their vote to, 
compared to 19% in 1998 (Gustafson 2014). 
 
Various institutional arrangements can both hinder and grant the radical right the 
ability to impact policy. For example it is hard for the British National Party 
(BNP) and the Front National (FN) to achieve impact on policy compared to 
similar radical right parties in other European countries due to the plurality voting 
systems used in in France and Great Britain (Hague and Harrop 2010: 181). 
Proportional representation voting system, such as the Swedish, can create a 
situation where no coalition or single party holds the majority if there is a party 
none of the sides wishes to actively collaborate with, such as a radical right party. 
In such a situation the radical right party holds the balance of power (Loxbo 
2010). Following the 2014 general election in Sweden the SD got 12.9% of the 
votes while none of the other coalitions gaining over 50% of the votes. The SD 
decided to support the right-wing oppositions’ budget causing a government 
crisis. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven initially decided to call for a re-election, a 
decision which was revoked at the last minute due to an agreement with the right-
wing opposition. This example illustrates two things. First, the disproportional 
amount of power granted by the balance of power position. With merely 12.9% of 
the votes the pariah party SD almost caused a government crisis. Second, the last 
minute agreement (referred to as the “December agreement”) is a perfect example 
of political isolation (Larsson 2014).  
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The nature of the ideology of the radical right is highly debated among scholars 
but one of the most impactful accounts of radical right nature is given by Cas 
Mudde (2007: 18ff, 2010). Mudde argues that three ideas are at the core of the 
radical right; nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nativism is an idea stating 
that a nation-state belongs to a specific people with a specific culture. 
Authoritarianism refers to a belief in a society that is strictly ordered in which 
infringements with regard to this order are to be punished harshly. Populism is, in 
this context, the idea of society being divided into to two groups, the just 
commoners and the corrupt elite. The radical right represents the just commoners 
and sees it as their mission to make the volonté général (general will) of the 
people to triumph of the wishes and ambitions of the corrupt elite (Ibid). Mudde 
(2010) argues that these ideas are not alien to the traditional mainstream 
ideologies of Western Europe; on the contrary they are closely linked and 
embedded in our societies. A verrechsting as a response from the mainstream 
parties might not be a far stretch. In fact, it has been acknowledged that European 
countries have been adopting stricter immigration laws in the passing decades 
(Schain 2006). This is generally not attributed to the direct impact of the radical 
right, they merely seen as catalysts, in other words indirect impact (Bale 2008; 
Mudde 2013). The pressure caused by the existence of the radical right has made 
mainstream parties to implement policies favored by the radical right. The 
ideological nature of the radical right gives us a hint on which policy issues the 
radical right focus on. The policy question studied in this thesis, refugee reception, 
is an example of nativist policy which radical right parties want to affect 
negatively (i.e. reducing the level of refugee reception) (Mudde 1999). 
 
The above discussion has mostly focused on the theoretical possibilities of policy 
impact for the radical right. In terms of the actual empirical evidence of the impact 
of the radical right the conclusions are few and often contradictory (Bolin et. al 
2014: 325ff). For instance, Duncan (2010) concludes that regulation regarding 
immigration has not become stricter by the hands of FPÖ, a view not shared by 
Akkerman & de Lange (2012). This may be due to the hardship of comparing 
across national borders (i.e. differing institutions) (Bolin et.al. 2014: 326). As 
aforementioned, the number of cases where radical right parties have been in 
government or actively supported a government was up until 2012 only seven 
(Ibid). This has made any large n-analysis impossible, thus the empirical analysis 
are mostly consisting of national case studies and sub-national analysis.  
 
The sub-national level is very interesting to study as it is the arena in which most 
radical right parties gain their initial and often their biggest electoral success. But 
when studying policy impact the local level of governing is not an ideal context to 
study, to cite Cas Mudde: 
 
“[…] [O]ne of the few points standing out among virtually all cases of 
populist radical right rule at the local level is the emphasis on 
symbolic measures. As the parties rapidly notice that local power is 
highly limited, particularly with regard to the nativist policies at the 
core of their program […]” 
(Mudde 2007: 279) 
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The case of Sweden is unique in this regard as refugee reception is a process 
which involves both the national and municipal level but in the end is a question 
decided in the local municipal councils. In other words, the local level in Sweden 
offers a unique opportunity to study the policy impact of the radical right. The 
following section aims at describing this process. 
 
2.2 The Process of Refugee Reception in Sweden 
The process of refugee reception in Sweden is an ongoing collaboration between 
national institutions and the local municipalities.
2
 The migration board is the 
national authority which grants residence permits to refugees. When a person is 
granted residence permit the first step of the process is to find a place of residence. 
The central decision of this part of the process is the “county number”3. Based on 
the national need the Swedish Public Employment Service
4
, in collaboration with 
the Migration Board
5
 and the county administrations, are to distribute the number 
of refugees every county is to receive. The calculation of the county number takes 
four variables into account and weighs them differently: Labor market (45%), 
housing market (15%), demography (10%) and population size (30%). In addition 
the spatial distribution of refugees registered at the Migration Board is taken into 
account; some manual adjustments are also made (Swedish Employment Service 
2013b). Based on these variables each of the 21 county administration boards is 
given a certain number of refugees to find accommodation for (Swedish 
Employment Service 2013a). The county administration boards are institutions 
representing the national government in the Swedish counties. At this point of the 
process the county administrations have to find municipalities who are willing to 
accommodate the refugees appointed to each county administration in the county 
number (Ericsson 2011).  
 
Immigrants and refugees are allowed to reside anywhere they want, thus the 
county number is divided into two categories of refugees: assigned refugees and 
self-residence refugees. Assigned refugees consist of people who cannot find 
accommodation for themselves, one of the 290 municipalities will have to 
accommodate them. The self-residence spots consist of people who can find a 
place to live on their own. The county number is accordingly divided into 
assigned refugees and expected self-residence refugees. The municipality in which 
an assigned refugee or a self-residence refugee resides in must supply the 
necessary services for the person in question. The services include among other 
things; education in the Swedish language, primary and secondary education and 
social services. The municipality is granted compensation by the national 
government for the services they provide. The county administration boards have 
                                                 
2
 A telephone interview with Gisela Andersson (gisela.andersson@lansstyrelsen.se), Integration Director of the 
County Administration in Kronoberg, was conducted the 21/10-2014. This interview is in addition to sources 
listed the main source of this section. 
3
 (sv =”länstal”) 
4
 (sv = “Arbetsförmedlingen) 
5
 (sv =) “Migrationsverket” 
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to come to an agreement with the municipalities when it comes to finding housing 
for assigned refugees. In order to obtain political support the county 
administration boards usually meet with municipal executive branch and high 
ranking municipal civil servants (Swedish Employment Service 2013b). The 
decision whether or not to accept the number of assigned refugees proposed by the 
county administration board is being made by the municipal council. In some rare 
instances they can delegate this decision to a municipal committee, but they 
maintain the chance of revoking this delegation. The county administration boards 
are the representatives of the national government in the negotiations, if an 
agreement is reached it is between the Migration Board (another national 
institution) and the municipalities (Ericsson 2011). Below, in figure 1, a simplified 
version of the process is illustrated. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Process of Refugee Reception in Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment: Simplified illustration of the actors participating in the process of refugee acceptance in Sweden. 
Source: (Swedish employment service 2013a; 2013b) & interview with Gisela Andersson (see footnote on 
previous page). 
 
 
Since the municipal council can decide how many assigned refugees they will 
accommodate, this thesis will distinguish between assigned refugees and self-
residence refugees; this has not been done in any study examining the question of 
policy impact by the SD on local refugee reception (Bolin et al. 2014). The 
following section aims at theoretically understand how the SD possibly could 
influence and alter the outcome of the process of assigned refugee reception based 
on the theoretical framework presented thus far and the process described above. 
2.3 The SD and refugee reception in Swedish 
municipalities 
Assigned refugee reception in Sweden is, as stated above, a question for the 
municipal council on the one side and the national government on the other. The 
SD has had a strong presence in many Swedish municipal councils’ since 2010. In 
the 2014 election they gained over 20 % of the seats in a few municipal councils 
Public Employment 
Service 
County 
Administration Board 
Migration Board 
County 
Number 
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Assigned 
Refugees 
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(Swedish Election Authorites 2014). It is probable that they, in cases where they 
have a large portion of the seats, have the ability to impact the municipal council’s 
decision in whether or not to make a deal with the county administration boards in 
the question of supplying housing to assigned refugees. The research that has been 
done on the policy impact by the SD has failed to identify any correlation between 
lowered refugee reception and SD seat share (Bolin et al. 2014). The reason for 
the lack of correlation may be the fact that the SD has a hard time finding 
candidates to fill their seats in the municipal council and the dropout out rate their 
candidates are higher than mainstream parties (Lundahl 2014). A lacking 
organization and empty seats is not likely to result in policy impact, an example of 
this is the Swiss and Italian case, their respective radical right parties were in 
government but did not achieve any major policy change (Akkerman and de 
Lange 2013). Research support the notion that a strong, especially local, 
organizational ability is one of the essential requirements for radical right parties 
to gain electoral success and achieve policy impact (Akkerman and de Lange 
2013; Art 2011). By having a stable and professional local organization the SD 
could have an impact on the municipal council’s decision to supply assigned 
refugees with housing. 
 
Sweden has a proportional electoral system. Decisions are generally made by 
majority rule; the municipal councils are no exception. This can system produces 
the potential outcome of no party or coalition holding a majority in the assembly if 
a third actor is present, in this scenario the third party holds the balance of power 
(Loxbo 2010). This so called institutional opportunity structure is a consequence 
of the electoral system (Mudde 2007: 232f). If the SD holds the balance of power 
it forces the mainstream parties to make a decision, cooperate with the SD, find 
support in former opponents (a so called cordon sanitaire) or change their policies 
(policy co-optation) (Downs 2001; Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2009). Research 
has shown that if the SD obtains the balance of power in the municipal council 
refugee reception is reduced (Bolin et al. 2014). This could be explained by two 
things, cooperation between the SD and the other actors in the party system or an 
adjustment in policy by the mainstream parties in reaction to the presence of the 
SD (a fear of losing electoral support) (Mudde 2013; Schain 2009). 
 
As aforementioned, the traditional actors in a party system react in one of three 
ways when a radical right party breaks through, by isolating them, collaborating 
with them or adjusting their policy in the direction of the new contender. Research 
has shown that the potential direct policy impact of radical right parties is limited 
when they are isolated (Mudde 2013). If, on the other hand, mainstream parties 
take a right-turn in issues close at heart to radical right parties their chances of 
success increases, previous studies have demonstrated that when the authoritarian 
views on the radical right parties’ main issue (immigration) are shared by 
mainstream parties it serves as a facilitation of the radical right thus increasing 
their electoral support (Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012).  Furthermore, a tougher 
view on immigration amongst local mainstream politicians correlates negatively 
with local refugee reception (Bolin et al. 2014). There are arguments supporting 
the notion that traditional right-wing parties are more prone to lean towards the 
policies and attitudes of the radical right (Bale 2008). Based on the above section, 
three hypotheses that will guide the research question are formulated. 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical framework three hypotheses are constructed. The first 
hypothesis is derived from the organizational theory stating that a stable and 
professional (local) organization could enable the SD to impact the policy 
question at the center of the issue formulation (Art 2013; Akkerman & de Lange 
2012). This factor has not been utilized by other studies examining the 
relationship at the centre of this thesis (Bolin et.al. 2014): 
 
 H1: The SD effects refugee reception negatively in municipalities where they 
have a strong local presence (supply). 
The second hypothesis is built on the theory of the opportunity structure granted 
by the power of balance (Loxbo 2010; Bolin et.al. 2014). By holding the balance 
of power the SD can take advantage of this opportunity structure by either being 
the deciding factor in assembly voting’s  (by collaborating) or by influencing 
mainstream to move closer to the position of the SD (co-optation) in fear of losing 
electoral support (Schain 2009). The SD can be shut out if the mainstream parties 
form a cordon sanitaire. Research has shown that a grand coalition is not the most 
common response when the SD holds the balance of power in the municipal 
council; instead minority rule is the most common response (Loxbo 2010). The 
potential policy impact could thus be both direct (collaboration) and indirect (co-
optation): 
 
 H2: The SD effects refugee reception negatively in municipalities where they 
have a balance of power position (political opportunity structure). 
The third hypothesis, H3, states that in municipalities where a negative attitude 
towards immigration is shared by right-wing mainstream parties’ refugee 
reception is reduced. Research has shown that a negative attitude amongst 
mainstream local party representatives towards accepting refugee’s in one’s 
municipality increase the electoral support for the SD and reduces refugee 
reception (Bolin et al. 2014; Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). In other words, a 
negative view on refugee reception among mainstream party candidates creates an 
opportunity structure which the SD can utilize to potentially increase their policy 
impact. The traditional right-wing parties are according to some scholar more 
likely to adjust their views and policies towards the radical right (Bale 2008). 
Thus, if the hypothesis below is supported there is reason to believe it is due to 
indirect policy impact by the SD through co-optation of policy by the right-wing 
parties:  
 
 H3: Refugee reception is reduced in municipalities where right-wing mainstream 
party representatives share the authoritarian view towards immigration held by the 
SD. 
 11 
 
3 Data 
The following pages will present the operationalization based on data availability 
and the theoretical framework that has been presented. 
3.1 Operationalization 
The research problem at the center of this thesis is radical right parties and their 
potential to impact policy in the question of local assigned refugee reception. 
Thus, the dependent variable that will be used in this thesis is: 
 
 Dependent variable: Number of assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants 
Assigned refugees will be used instead of total number of refugees (assigned and 
self-residence refugees) due to the fact that the municipal council can decide how 
many assigned refugees their municipality will accommodate, other refugees are 
free to live wherever they find a place to reside (Ericsson 2011). This variable is 
divided by 10000 inhabitants to account for the discrepancy in size that exist 
among Swedish municipalities. The study which is most closely related to this 
(Bolin et.al. 2014) used the total number of refugees (assigned plus self-residence) 
as a dependent variable. The choice to use only assigned refugees is motivated by 
the fact that municipal council have a direct political power to decide how many 
assigned refugees they are willing to accommodate, they have no way of 
controlling how many self-residence refugees choose to live in their respective 
municipality.  
 
As illustrated in chart 1 the assigned number of refugees on a national level has 
been fairly constant (except for 2006) in the time period presented while the total 
number is fluctuating. The potential effect the SD might have had in deciding the 
number of assigned refugees could be “hidden” in the total number of refugees 
residing in a municipality, a process in which they have no direct say in (since 
most refugees find accommodation on their own). I argue that looking at only the 
assigned refugees allows us to study the policy in which the SD logically have a 
desire and ability to impact policy in, to them, the best way possible. It would be 
wrong to assume that number of assigned refugees and self-residence refugees is 
not connected at all. For example, early in the process of refugee reception (the 
county numbers) the county administration boards are given a number of assigned 
refugees to find accommodation for; this is based on a prediction of the number of 
refugees to reside in the county (Swedish Employment Service 2013a). 
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Chart 1: Total number of refugees & assigned refugees (national level) 
Comment: Dashed line = Total number of refugees (assigned + self-residence refugees), filled line 
= assigned refugees. (Source: Swedish Migration Board) 
 
Furthermore, self-residence refugees require the same services as assigned 
refugees (aside from accommodation) such as Swedish lesson, social services and 
healthcare, it is a possibility that a municipality which is inhabited by a lot of self-
residence refugees to provide services for are less inclined to accommodate 
assigned refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013). On the contrary, it is also plausible 
that municipalities who accommodate a lot of self-residence refugees already have 
the tradition and experience (services in place etc.) which allows them to 
accommodate more assigned refugees (Ibid). This theoretical ambiguity motivates 
the choice to include self-residence refugees as control variable (see page 17). 
3.2 Main explanatory variables 
Since the number of refugees is decided in negotiations between the municipal 
council and the county administration board (Ericsson 2011) it is be necessary to 
measure the share of SD seats in the municipal council: 
 
 1st Independent variable: Share of SD seats in the municipal council 
This measures the proportion of seats the gained by the SD in the municipal 
councils. This variable is necessary to include but its solidity is questionable based 
on prior research (Bolin et.al. 2014), theoretical reasoning and empirical reality. 
Empirically, SD has a hard time attracting people to represent them in municipal 
councils all around the country. As many as 157 SD seats in 97 municipal 
councils are empty following the 2014 election (Quensel and Vergara 2014). 
Theoretically SD needs to supply a well-functioning organization in order to be 
successful and have policy impact this factor needs to be taken into account (Art 
2013; Akkerman & de Lange 2012). It is logically improbable to assume that SD 
0
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can impact refuge reception, even if they theoretically maintain balance of power, 
if they do not have anyone representing them. Thus, the second independent 
variable is derived from the organizational theoretical tradition regarding radical 
right parties (Art 2011). This theoretical perspective argues that the electoral 
success and thus the policy impact of the radical right is decided by their ability to 
supply a well-organized choice to the voters (Ibid). The second independent 
variable is: 
 
 2nd Independent variable: Organizational ability (Number of SD candidates/total 
number of seats in municipal council) 
This variable is calculated by dividing the number of seats occupied by SD 
representatives in the municipal council by the total share of seats in the municipal 
council. This is the independent variable related to H1. 
 
As aforementioned, a balance of power position strengthens the position of SD. 
Research has shown that this may have an effect on refugee reception on a local 
level (Bolin et.al. 2014). Previous studies have also shown that a balance of power 
position enables SD to be more politically relevant (Loxbo 2012). This 
institutional opportunity structure is important to include in the research design 
and thus constitute the third independent variable: 
 
 3rd independent variable: Balance of power (SD) 
The above variable is a dichotomous variable. The balance of power is an 
institutional opportunity structure that arises when no other coalition or party has 
the majority in a parliamentary setting. This is the independent variable related to 
H2.  
 
To illustrate the potential outcomes of the balance of power position in a graphic 
manner the spatial model of legislation described in the theory section can be 
used. The theory section stated that mainstream parties have three (main) 
strategies to when a radical right party; isolation, collaboration and co-optation 
(Downs 2001). Figure 4 on the following page illustrates how policy decisions 
theoretically can change when the SD holds balance of power. The reason this 
model is reintroduced is the due to the fact we have theoretical anchored scenario 
on which it can be applied upon, SD holds balance of power. 
 
This rational choice model (page 14) is a simplification of the reality but can help 
us illustrate the processes graphically (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). Let us assume 
a parliamentary position (pure majority) after an election where coalition a obtains 
45% of the votes, coalition b obtains 45% of the votes and a third (new) actor,  
SD, has 10% of the votes in the parliament thus holding the balance of power. The 
first strategy the mainstream coalitions can employ is political isolation through a 
cordon sanitaire (A). In this case the SD is prevented from any influence in the 
policy decision as coalition a and b has a majority on their own. Theory suggests 
that an ostracizing strategy such as the one described creates political opportunity 
structures in the long run and may thus not be a viable long-  
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Figure 4: Policy outcome when the SD holds balance of power 
 
 
 
 
Comment:  The figure illustrates a spatial model of legislation, coalition (a) & (b) and a radical 
right party (SD) and their respective preferred positions (ticks) on a policy preference line. Source: 
(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). 
 
 
term strategy for the mainstream parties when dealing with radical right parties 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1997, 2007; Loxbo 2014; Minkenberg 
2001). This is not the usual strategy employed in Swedish municipal councils 
(Loxbo 2010) 
 
The second strategy (B) that may be used by mainstream parties is to collaborate 
with the SD in order to gain a majority in the municipal council (Downs 2001). 
This would grant the SD direct policy influence and allows them to make a  policy 
decision favorable to them; this is illustrated by the policy decision’s proximity to 
the SD preferred outcome on the preference line (SD). 
 
Strategy C, co-optation, illustrates the two possible policy outcomes that can 
occur when mainstream party change their stance in issues towards a view that is 
closer to the SD. The reason for this would be to pursue voters not to vote for the 
radical right (in this case the SD). If the mainstream parties choose to employ such 
a strategy they still have to choose whether or not to collaborate or isolate the 
radical right in order to reach a policy decision in a parliamentary setting where 
(Political isolation) (Collaboration) 
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the radical right holds the balance of power. Both of these choices yields a policy 
decision that is favorable to the SD, collaboration more so than isolation (Figure 
5, C). Summa summarum, policy co-optation by the mainstream parties gives the 
SD indirect policy influence in a parliamentary setting where they hold balance of 
power. The above model (C) show a scenario where both coalitions (a and b) 
adjust their policy position, in reality if only one of the coalitions would adjust 
their position SD’s policy impact is still increased, just not as much (see the varied 
remoteness of SD’s preferred position to the two potential outcomes). 
When the SD holds balance of power they can either have no policy influence 
(isolation), direct policy influence (collaboration) or indirect policy influence (co-
optation).   
 
Yet another opportunity structure that needs to be taken into account is the 
mainstream parties’ views on the radical right’s core issue, immigration. Opposing 
parties’ policy position is essential for party strategy and success (Meguid 2008). 
Recent studies have highlighted that a tough and negative stance on immigration 
within mainstream parties, on a local level, correlates with increased support for 
SD on a local level (Dahlström and Sundell 2012). Furthermore, recent studies 
have shown some support that a widespread negative stance towards immigration 
among local politicians in municipal councils may have a negative effect on local 
refugee reception (Bolin et.al. 2014). This variable, connected to H3, was 
collected as a part of the KOLFU survey which is presented in publications from 
the University of Gothenburg (Gilljam et al. 2010). All municipal council 
members in Sweden were asked to respond to the statement  “receive less refugees 
to the municipality” and rate how good they believed the statement was on scale 
of one to five, with one being “very good”, three “neutral” and five “very bad”. 
The variable has been transformed into a variable ranging from 0 (very bad) to 
100 (very good). SDs municipal council member have been excluded from this 
variable as they would probably skew the result in municipal councils they have a 
lot of representation. Furthermore, this variable has been divided into two parts, 
one measuring the attitude among the left coalition members and one the attitude 
among their traditional antagonists. The parties in the left coalition are the Social 
Democratic Party (S), the Green Party (MP) and the Left Party (V). The parties in 
the right coalition are the Moderate Party (M), the Christian Democratic Party 
(KD), the Peoples Party (FP) and the Center Party (C).
6
 The division between 
these two coalitions is ideological and empirical (Hadenius 2008). Traditionally 
these parties have been ideological antagonists, since 2006 the division is 
empirically solid since the formal right coalition called the “Alliance”7 received a 
majority of the votes in the national election. They kept the incumbency until the 
2014 when S and MP formed a minority government with the support of V 
following the general election (Swedish Election Authorites 2014). Studies have 
shown that the right local representatives are generally more negative towards 
immigration than their left counterparts, but in the cases where the left have 
negative attitudes the facilitating effect of the SD is increased (Dahlstrom and 
Sundell 2012). The two independent variables derived from this theoretical 
background are: 
 
                                                 
6
 (sv=) Socialdemokraterna (S), Miljöpartiet (MP), Vänsterpartiet (V), Moderaterna (M), Kristdemokraterna 
(KD), Folkpartiet (FP) and Centerpartiet (C). 
7
 (sv=) Alliansen 
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 4th independent variable: Attitude towards immigration among right-wing 
coalition municipal council members. 
 5th independent variable: Attitude towards immigration among left-wing coalition 
municipal council members. 
A negative attitude among right-wing representatives is thought to have a negative 
impact on the dependent variable, assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (H3) 
(Bolin et al. 2014; Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). 
3.3 Control variables 
Below, the theoretically anchored control variables are presented. They all stem 
from structural explanations on refugee reception; in short these theories state that 
refugee reception is determined by non-political structural factors (Lidén and 
Nyhlén 2013).  
 
 1st control variable: Unemployment rate 
This variable measures the unemployment rate in all of the 290 Swedish 
municipalities. A high unemployment rate is thought to have a negative impact on 
refugee reception (Freeman 2011). 
 
The financial state of a municipality can theoretically have an effect on how 
willing a municipality is to accommodate refugees. Deriving from theories from 
the neo-classical tradition it can be assumed that municipalities with a rich 
population have a high demand for a workforce. Poorer municipality could on the 
other hand be incentivized by the compensations from the national government 
associated with refugee reception (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013). The distribution and 
equality of resources (i.e. income) is associated with the quality of and trust in 
public institutions (Rothstein 2011). This could in extension lead to the outcome 
that an equal distribution of resources increases a municipality’s refugee reception 
(Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).  Two control variables can be derived from this 
reasoning: 
 
 2nd control variable: Average income  
 3rd control variable: Gini-coefficient 
In order to accept assigned refugees available housing is a necessity. Many of the 
municipalities who do not accept a lot of assigned refugees claim that it is due to 
lack of available housing (Delby and Wrede 2013). 
 
 4th control variable: Share of free apartments among the local housing companies 
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Theoretically, a large share of the population with a foreign background is 
connected to the dependent variable as a large share of the population with foreign 
background signals a tradition of receiving immigrants. This would lead to a 
higher ambition and competence in the reception of refugees (Massey et al. 1993).  
A person with a foreign background is in this thesis defined as a person born 
abroad or a person with both parents born abroad. 
 
 5th  control variable: Share of population with foreign background 
 6th control variable: Self-residence refugees received per 10000 inhabitants 
The above (6
th
) variable could theoretically have a be connected to the dependent 
variable under the same reasoning as the above (5
th
 control) variable. But it could 
also have a negative effect as municipalities with a large portion of self-residence 
refugees have to supply a lot of resources to accommodate the refugees they did 
not actively choose to receive. This could result in an unwillingness to actively 
receive assigned refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013). The following section 
discusses the general nature of the data. 
3.4 A note on the data and data set 
The data used in this thesis contains information from two consecutive Swedish 
terms of office, the first following the term subsequent the 2006 election and the 
second the term following the 2010 election. Elections are held late in the year in 
Sweden (September) and the first year that will be studied is thus 2007. The 
logical argument behind this choice is the fact that it is unlikely for changes in the 
municipal council to have an effect on policy the minute they enter office in 
September. The potential effect is more than likely seen starting the following 
year (new budget etc.). This yields a seven year time-period that will be studied 
(2007-2013). All variables used in the TSCS data uses the unique data from each 
municipality each year
8
. 
 
The unit of study in this thesis is Swedish municipalities, as of today, Sweden has 
290 municipalities. Each value used is the unique value for the municipality in 
question for each year, 290 municipalities studied over seven years yields 2030 
total observations. For detailed descriptive statistics of all the independent 
variables see Appendix 1. 
 
One of the advantages connected to a sub-national statistical analysis is the fact 
several factors that have to be taken into account are held at a constant, the best 
example of this is institutional arrangements and number of parties studied (this 
study only have concern itself with the SD) that generally vary in cross-national 
studies (Bolin et. al. 2014: 326). In addition to this the number of units observed 
are much greater than any cross-national study ever would when studying policy 
                                                 
8
 The exceptions are “Average income” and “Gini-coefficient-coefficient” as the data for 2013 for these two 
variables is unavailable (Statistics Sweden 2013). 
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impact of the radical right in Europe. These two reasons are generally seen as the 
main reason for the inconstancy found in the literature on this subject (Ibid). 
 
A note on validity in terms of data collection, most of the data was downloaded 
and used in its original form from the sources presented in the thesis (in tables and 
in Appendix 1). The data from the Migration Board had to be sorted manually due 
to a different original sorting compared to all the other sources. In order to control 
for any possible mistakes an external reviewer was asked to sample the manually 
sorted variables, no errors were found. All statistical models were computed by 
STATA 12.
9
 
 
The usual method section (describing the various methodological decisions) seen 
in theses such as this one has been incorporated into the result section. The reason 
behind this choice is the fact that a many different statistical methods and 
instruments will be used in order to analyze the research question at hand, ranging 
from very simple but effective bivariate descriptive statistics to data demanding 
TSCS-analysis. To present all the methodological decision separately in section 
prior to the results would be ill-advised as they are better presented and 
understood as the analysis progresses onwards.  
 
                                                 
9
 For contact details to the external reviewer and STATA-logs of all the computations, contact 
sam13kek@student.lu.se  
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4 Results and Method 
The results from the statistical models are presented in this section. As stated in 
the previous chapter a lot of different statistical methods will be used including 
descriptive statistics and various TSCS-analysis in order to examine the research 
question in a fruitful manner. The idea behind using all of these different 
instruments is to logically build a comprehensive statistical model that tackles the 
research question in a holistic manner. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The first of the main explanatory variables is SD seat share. Based on the 
theoretical logic claiming that in parliamentary situation where the SD obtain a 
large proportion of the seats in the municipal council they will increase their 
potential policy impact, i.e. reducing the number of assigned refugees received in 
the municipality. In chart 2 below, the relationship is explored with the use 
descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Chart 2: DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants & Share of SD seats 
Comment: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Years (2007-2013). Dashed 
line SD seat share (4th quartile), filled line average (all municipalities). (Source: & Migration 
Board (2013)) 
 
As seen in chart 2 above the level of assigned refugee reception in the 
municipalities where the SD has the strongest support (4
th
 quartile) is lower than 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Municipalities in which SD is strong All municipalities
 20 
 
the average in all Swedish municipalities. According to these findings the SD’s 
sheer share of seat seats has a negative effect on the level of assigned refugees 
received in a municipality.  
 
Theory suggests that a well-functioning organization is key for the radical right in 
terms of electoral success and policy impact (Akkerman and de Lange 2013; Art 
2011; Mudde 2010). Chart 3 below graphically presents the bivariate relationship 
between the independent variable connected to H1 (organizational capacity) and 
the dependent variable.  
 
Chart 3: DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants & Organizational capacity  
 
Comments: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Organizational capacity. 
Bivariate regressions (2006: 𝑦 = 9.106 + (−0.197 × 𝑋) significant at the *** level p < 0.01, 2010: 
𝑦 = 12.88 + (−0.286 × 𝑋) significant at the *** level p < 0.01. Adjusted R2 0.033 (2006) & 0.087 
(2010). N = 290. Source: Swedish Migration Board (2013) & Swedish Election Authority (2013). 
 
 
As illustrated by graph 3 the number of assigned refugees is negatively correlated 
with the organizational capacity of the SD on a local level. In other words, if the 
SD is better organized on a local level fewer assigned refugees will be received in 
the municipality. The effect is increased in the second time period, (2007-2010) 
but the results are negative and significant in both cases. The results presented in 
chart 3 shows support for H1 connected to the organizational capacity of the 
radical right. 
 
The explanatory variable related to H2 is the dummy variable SD balance of 
power. The theoretical framework argues that the SD can use this institutional 
opportunity structure to leverage their power in order to influence policy 
(potentially both direct and indirect) (Bolin et al. 2014; Loxbo 2010). Chart 4 on 
the following page displays the number of assigned refugees per 10000 
inhabitants in all municipalities (filled line) and in the municipalities where the 
SD holds the balance of power (dashed line). 
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Chart 4: DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants in all municipalities & balance 
of power (SD) 
 
 
Comment: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Years (2007-2013) Dashed 
line = SD in balance of power, filled line = SD not in balance of power. (Source: Statistics Sweden 
& Swedish Migration Board)  
 
Chart 4 clearly demonstrates that in municipalities where the SD holds the balance 
of power the level of assigned refugee reception is lower compared to the national 
average. In the municipalities where SD holds the balance of power the average 
assigned refugee level is around 4 to 6 per 10000 inhabitants. The national 
average varies from around 8 to 11 per 10000 inhabitants in the studied time 
period. The evidence presented in chart 4 shows support for H2.  
 
In the case of the mainstream parties views on immigration the theoretical 
framework suggests that in municipalities where the mainstream party 
representatives have a negative view on refugee reception the level of assigned 
refugee reception is lower (Bolin et al. 2014). Furthermore, right-wing party 
representatives are generally assumed to have a tougher view on immigration than 
left-wing party representatives. Research has shown that in cases where both 
right-wing and left-wing parties the radical right is facilitated and legitimized 
(Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). Chart 5 examines the number of assigned refugees 
per 10000 inhabitants in municipalities where mainstream party representatives 
have a negative view on refugee reception compared to the national average (4
th
 
quartile). 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
All Municpalities Municpalities in which SD holds balance of power
 22 
 
Chart 5: DV: Assigned refugee reception/10000 inhabitants & Mainstream party 
toughness towards immigration (4
th
 quartiles) 
 
Comment: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Years (2007-2013)  Filled 
line average (all municipalities), short dashed line (rightwing coalition 48.44), long dashed line 
(leftwing coalition 31.25). (Source: (Gilljam et al. 2010) & Swedish Migration board (2013)). 
 
As seen in chart 5 in the municipalities where right-wing representatives have a 
negative view towards receiving more refugees in their municipality the actual 
level of assigned refugees is lower than the national average. In the case of left-
wing representatives with the most negative attitudes the level of assigned refugee 
reception is actually higher than the national average. The result presented in chart 
5 gives support to H3, where right-wing representatives are the most negative 
towards receiving more refugees the actual number of assigned refugees is slightly 
lower than the national average; this relationship is supported by previous 
research (Dahlström & Sundell 2012; Bolin et.al 2014). 
   
 The descriptive statistics presented above have supplied a first glance at the 
supposed relationship being investigated in this study. In the next section the 
results from the linear regression models are presented in order to further examine 
the research question and hypotheses. 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Average (all municipalities) Tough attitude (Left-wing)
Tough attitude (right-wing)
 23 
 
4.2 Linear regression model 
Prior to TSCS analysis some issues related to the data will be discussed. Some of 
the variables are subject to problems connected to distribution. Since the data used 
in this study is not a random sample but a complete sample this is a problem that 
cannot be avoided, but dealt with. The variables that suffer from this problem will 
be transformed using their natural logarithm.
10
 This is also one way of dealing 
with the issue of heteroskedasticity (Edling and Hedström 2003). 
Heteroskedasticity is issue of non-constant errors skewing the effect of the Y-
variable in a regression model. In short, if the variance in Y is affected by non-
constant errors in an independent variable it is an issue of heteroskedasticity 
(Ibid). This causes some units to affect the dependent variable more than others; 
the relationship appears to be linear when it, in fact, is not. One way of dealing 
with this is to, as mentioned above, transform the variables using their natural 
logarithm. An even more fruitful way is to use robust (panel corrected) standard 
errors. In short, robust standard errors correct the standard errors of the regression 
function making them reliable even when heteroskedasticity is a potential issue 
(Ibid). The useful characteristic about TSCS-data is the fact that we can observe 
the data both through time and space, some considerations need to be taken into 
account though.
11
 
  
4.3 TSCS analysis 
The most widely used model used when dealing with TSCS data is the so-called 
“Beck-Katz” standard model (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996; Plumper et al. 2005). 
This standard model incorporates panel corrected (robust) standard errors and a 
lagged dependent variable. The use of a lagged dependent variable is generally to 
account for the dynamics of the relationship (Djurfeldt & Barmark, 2009: 174). In 
addition, the model stresses that fixed effects should be used in order to account 
for non-spherical errors (Beck and Katz 1996). Basically, this assumes that values 
are fixed (non-random) in contrast to other models which assume random effects. 
This is done by including unit dummies in the equation, in the case of this study; 
the spatial unit is municipalities (“fixed effects” is also called within estimation). 
Fixed effects absorbs the effect of the unobserved factors affecting the dependent 
variable that are constant and bound to the unit of study, in our case, 
municipalities. An example of such an effect is geographical location 
(Wooldridge 2012: 459f). A linear regression model using “Beck-Katz standard” 
described above, is presented on the following page.   
                                                 
10
 The variables transformed are: Assigned refugees, Average income, self-residence refugees and the lagged 
dependent variable (t-1). Prior to the transformation all variables were added by 1.  
11
 Linear regression models examining both of the terms of office studied in this thesis is presented when run 
separately in appendix 2 & 3. This type of analysis utilizes averages of all variables over the time periods and 
thus loses data.  
  
 
Table 1: Linear regression model (PCSE, fixed effects & lagged DV) – DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (log) 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4) (5) (6a) (6b) 
Share of SD seats -0.00542 -0.0109       0.00714 -0.0117 
 (0.00624) (0.0145)       (0.00715) (0.0149) 
           
Balance of power (SD)   -0.168*** -0.176**     -0.175*** -0.187** 
   (0.0510) (0.0828)     (0.0603) (0.0829) 
           
Organizational capacity     0.00180 0.0213***   0.00590 0.0227*** 
     (0.00549) (0.00802)   (0.00578) (0.00810) 
           
Toughness (left coalition)       -0.000229  0.000236 - 
       (0.00229)  (0.00219)  
           
Toughness (right         -0.00643*** -0.00638*** - 
coalition)        (0.00229) (0.00241)  
           
Unemployment rate 0.0596*** -0.00480 0.0596*** -0.00270 0.0583*** -0.00155 0.0580*** 0.0580*** 0.0586*** -0.00419 
 (0.00932) (0.0194) (0.00901) (0.0188) (0.00923) (0.0189) (0.00912) (0.00896) (0.00971) (0.0194) 
           
Share of population with  -0.00605** 0.0618 -0.00610** 0.0571 -0.00656** 0.0612 -0.00646** -0.00493* -0.00529* 0.0785 
foreign background (0.00287) (0.0562) (0.00290) (0.0521) (0.00290) (0.0520) (0.00283) (0.00294) (0.00365) (0.0562) 
           
Share of free apartments 0.00936 -0.00802 0.00863 -0.00740 0.0105 -0.00559 0.0104 0.0120 0.0117 -0.00592 
 (0.00867) (0.0182) (0.00868) (0.0182) (0.00868) (0.0182) (0.00864) (0.00826) (0.00841) (0.0183) 
           
Population (log) -0.135*** -9.145*** -0.131*** -9.203*** -0.137*** -8.404*** -0.137*** -0.150*** -0.149*** -8.488*** 
 (0.0247) (1.581) (0.0245) (1.585) (0.0247) (1.611) (0.0237) (0.0271) (0.0266) (1.610) 
           
Self-residence refugees 0.0570** 0.0286 0.0586** 0.0324 0.0593** 0.0278 0.0592** 0.0514** 0.0537** 0.0274 
(log) (0.0249) (0.0354) (0.0248) (0.0353) (0.0248) (0.0349) (0.0249) (0.0245) (0.0250) (0.0350) 
           
Gini-coefficient -0.432 -2.578 -0.295 -2.344 -0.463 -1.651 -0.462 -0.0998 0.0296 -1.745 
 (0.614) (1.687) (0.605) (1.697) (0.200) (1.699) (0.616) (0.624) (0.620) (1.715) 
           
Average income (log) 0.0916 3.290*** 0.0111 3.016*** 0.118 3.248*** 0.106 -0.00502 -0.0488 3.357*** 
 (0.195) (0.980) (0.194) (0.975) (0.263) (0.969) (0.194) (0.199) (0.198) (0.989) 
           
Lagged dependent  0.507*** 0.102*** 0.502*** 0.100*** 0.505*** 0.0970*** 0.505*** 0.501*** 0.494*** 0.0945** 
variable (t-1)  (0.0281) (0.0371) (0.0278) (0.0371) (0.0277) (0.0369) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0296) (0.0368) 
           
Constant 1.502 - 1.869* - 1.383 - 1.453   2.340** 2.523** - 
 (1.041)  (1.044)  (1.070)  (1.018) (1.097) (1.080)  
Unit dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations (n) 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 
R2 0.411 0.099 0.413 0.101 0.411 0.105 0.4106 0.415 0.4176 0.108 
Comments: Standard errors in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, values replaced with “ – “ were omitted. Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), 
Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014).  
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Since the variable measuring the toughness of mainstream party representatives 
uses the 2008 value in all years (due to data availability) fixed effects cannot 
incorporate them into the calculations, they are therefore omitted. 
 
Model 1 in table 1 analysis the relationship between the variable measuring the 
share of SD seats in the 290 municipal councils and the dependent variable. The 
theoretical argument connected to this variable argues that as representation 
increases for the SD in parliaments, their potential policy impact increases with it 
(Bolin et al. 2014). Other studies have not found this relationship to be significant 
in the case of Sweden (ibid). The results from model (1) indicate that the level of 
assigned refugee reception is not lowered as the SD’s proportional representation 
increases, there is no significant correlation. Using fixed effects does not alter the 
correlation between the independent and dependent variable (model 1b). 
 
The variable connected to H2, balance of power, is examined in model 2 in table 
1. The institutional opportunity structure created by the parliamentary system in 
Sweden is theoretically linked to increased policy impact of the SD. By holding 
the balance of power none of the other actors can reach a decision in a pure 
majority parliamentary setting without either collaborating with the SD or creating 
a so called cordon sanitaire (Loxbo 2010). The finding presented in table 1 
demonstrate that in municipalities in which the SD holds the balance of power 
there is a decrease in the level of assigned refugees received in the municipality, 
the correlation is significant. Since the dependent variable has been subject to 
logarithmic transformation we have to use the exponential function of the result to 
observe the actual effect (in percent) of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. The interpreted result is that if the SD holds the balance of power the 
number of assigned refugees is lowered by about 17-19%
12
. The effect is 
maintained even with fixed effects (model 2b). In regard to the theoretical basis of 
this hypothesis it seems like the SD gains either policy impact directly by 
collaboration or indirectly through other parties co-opting their policies when they 
hold the balance of power.  
 
Model 3a demonstrates that the variable associated with H1, organizational 
capacity, does not correlate significantly with the dependent variable. 
Theoretically this variable relies on the logics of organizational theories of the 
radical right (Art 2011). These theories state that the radical right will thrive if 
they can organize well and by doing so supplying a serious choice to the voters 
and increase their potential policy impact. Interestingly, the effect of the variable 
in question is positive when fixed effects are calculated (model 3b). In other words 
in municipalities where SD has a lot of candidates on their ballot paper (weighted 
with the total number of mandates) the level of assigned refugees is received is 
                                                 
12
 To calculate the effect on the y-variable (DV) at an increase of one unit of the x-variable (IV) of a “Log-level” 
model (where the DV is a logarithmic variable and the IV level variable) you multiply the 𝛽-coefficient of x by  
100 (Wooldrigdge 2012: 44) 
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increased, contrary to the predicted theoretical argument, the effect is significant. 
This may be a case of reversed causality. The SD might attract more people to 
represent them in areas where more assigned refugees are received. 
 
Model 4 and 5 analyzes the effect of the attitudes regarding refugee reception of 
mainstream (right-wing) party representatives (H3) and how it correlates with the 
level of assigned refugee reception. As displayed in table 1 the attitudes of left-
wing coalition representatives does not have an effect on assigned refugee 
reception (model 4). The toughness of right-wing representatives does have 
negative effect on assigned refugee reception. Presented in model (5), a tougher 
view on refugee reception among right-wing representatives has a significantly 
negative effect on assigned refugee reception in their respective municipality. A 
one percent increase in toughness among right-wing representatives translates into 
0.7% less assigned refugees into their municipality. Theoretically this could be 
explained by the verrechtsing thesis that argues that the radical right has forced 
mainstream (especially right-wing) parties to adjust their policies in order to not 
lose voters to the radical right, in other words; indirect policy impact by the SD 
(Bale 2008). 
 
Model 6 in table 1 includes all independent variables, the results show that the 
correlations which were significant on their own, SD balance of power and 
toughness (right-wing coalition), still are significant. In terms of the control 
variables the results are fairly consistent in all models; the difference can be seen 
in random and fixed effects models. In models applying random effects (models 
“a”) unemployment rate is significantly positively correlates with assigned refugee 
reception, as unemployment rises, so does assigned refugee reception. Share of 
population with foreign background negatively correlates with assigned refugee 
reception, as shown in table X, so does a larger population. In the case of fixed 
effects population is the only control variable that remains significantly correlated. 
The control variable measuring average income is positively correlated with the 
dependent when fixing the effects.  
 
In terms of the coefficient of determination (R
2
) which measures how good data 
fits a model (Edling and Hedström 2003), when assuming random effects the R
2
 
value is fairly high with a value ranging from 0.427 to 0.433 (table 1). The R
2
 
values presented by the models using fixed effects cannot be compared to the 
values granted by the models using random effects as they display another value 
(within R
2
). 
 
At this stage of the analysis a few interesting points can be made. First, the 
variable measuring balance of power seems to be strongly and significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable, both when the models assume random and 
fixed effects. In other words, if the SD holds the balance of power in the 
municipal the level of assigned refugee reception is lowered. Theoretically, this 
could be understood as the SD having policy impact through co-optation of policy 
or collaboration. If the mainstream parties would politically isolate the SD would 
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not have any effect when holding balance of power (Downs 2001; Loxbo 2010). 
Second, the right-wing coalitions’ toughness toward refugee reception is 
negatively correlated with assigned refugee acceptance, this is supported by the 
theoretical framework related to H3. H2 and H3 seem to be the hypotheses that 
hold up the best according to the results presented in table 1; this is when using the 
“Beck-Katz standard”.  
 
The relationship studied in this paper is a dynamic relationship, in other words, we 
are looking at a relationship that is changing over time. In table 1 a lagged version 
dependent variable (t-1) was used to control for the dynamics. The inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable when using fixed effects cause a bias usually called a 
Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). Beck and Katz (2009) argue that their standard model 
is not problematic when T is fairly high (around 30-40), in those cases the Nickell 
bias is only a few percent. In our case when the time period only includes 8 years, 
the downward biased caused by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and 
fixed effects could potentially be much larger than a few percent (Nickell 1981). 
Another technique that can be used in an effort to control for and dynamic nature 
of the relationship is to include a series of time dummies (Plumper et al. 2005). A 
series of time dummies captures all factors that are unobserved and constant but  
 
Table 2: Linear regression model (fixed effects & time dummies) DV: Assigned 
refugees/10000 inhabitants (log)  
 (1a) (1b) (2) (3a) (3b) 
Share of SD seats    -0.00977 -0.0234 
    (0.00993) (0.0160) 
Balance of power (SD) -0.230*** -0.188**  -0.217** -0.180** 
 (0.0822) (0.0882)  (0.0881) (0.0889) 
Organizational capacity    0.0202** 0.0124 
    (0.00789) (0.00872) 
Toughness (left coalition)    0.00724* - 
    (0.00375)  
Toughness (right coalition)   -0.0105*** -0.00942** - 
   (0.00389) (0.00406)  
Unemployment rate -0.0125 -0.0711* -0.0167 -0.0162 -0.0677* 
 (0.0236) (0.0403) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0405) 
Share of population with  -0.00949* 0.0753 -0.00762 -0.00830 0.0925 
foreign background (0.00545) (0.0620) (0.00547) (0.00542) (0.0643) 
Share of free apartments 0.00859 -0.00348 0.0114 0.0105 -0.00316 
 (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0185) 
Population (log) -0.145*** -10.80*** -0.176*** -0.142*** -10.27*** 
 (0.0475) (1.681) (0.0502) (0.0502) (1.711) 
Self-residence refugees (log) 0.179*** 0.0815** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.0765** 
 (0.0319) (0.0359) (0.0320) (0.0312) (0.0355) 
Gini-coefficient -0.609 -0.263 -0.395 -0.303 -0.254 
 (1.061) (1.900) (1.069) (1.058) (1.912) 
Average income (log) -1.518*** 3.606 -1.567*** -1.625*** 3.437 
 (0.403) (3.904) (0.398) (0.396) (3.878) 
Unit dummies No Yes No No Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (n) 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 
R
2
 0.2100 0.118 0.4435 0.4463 0.118 
Comments: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,” - “ = Omitted Sources: Swedish 
Migration Board (2014), Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish 
Election authority (2014). 
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bound to the time-variable  which affects the dependent variable, an example of 
this in our case could be an exogenous shock such as a war causing an increase in 
refugees (Wooldrigde 2012: 460).   
 
In table 2 on the previous page time and unit dummies are incorporated into the 
equation along with random and fixed effects (unit dummies).
 
The effect of the 
various time dummies are not presented in table 2, but they are significant.
 13
 
 
As seen in table 2, the correlation between the level of assigned refugees and the 
balance of power maintains negative and significant (model 1) even when time 
and unit dummies are included. The effect remains significant when all variables 
are included (model 3), translated into percent the negative effect on the 
dependent variable around 18-23%. 
 
In the case of the variable connected to H3, the attitude towards refugee reception 
of mainstream (right-wing) party representatives, the previously presented effect 
(table 1) maintains its effect when time dummies are taken into account, the effect 
on the dependent variable is around 0.7% with every percent increase in toughness 
among right-wing local representatives. As stated previously, the unit dummy 
cannot account for the variables associated with H3 (toughness) since the value is 
the same for all years (2008 value). The results presented in table 2 support the 
previous findings, how can the hypotheses be further tested? 
 
The usage of time dummies and uniform lagged dependent variables is also 
associated with a few potential concerns. Plumper et. al. (2005) demonstrates that 
the inclusion of these two instruments often absorbs parts of the trend in the 
dependent variable and, that a uniform lagged dependent variable especially, cause 
bias estimates when used with a lagged dependent variable. Plumper et.al. (2005) 
recommend the usage of a Prais-Winsten (AR1) transformation instead of a 
uniformed lagged dependent variable. The main advantage with the Prais-Winsten 
regression is that it corrects for potential serial correlation of the errors which 
otherwise can make the result of a regression misleading (Wooldridge 2012: 
439f). In table 3 on the following a Prais-Winsten regression model with AR1 
auto-correction is presented.  
 
As seen in table 3 presented on the following page the two variables which were 
found have the most significant effect according to the “Beck-Katz” model, 
“Balance of power (SD)” and “Toughness” of the rightwing coalition, maintain 
their effect when the Prais-Winsten regression is introduced. This is confirmed in 
model 2 and model 5 in table 3. The actual effect in terms of percent is a 36% 
decrease in assigned refugees in a municipality in which the SD holds the balance 
of power as seen in model 6 in in which all variables are taken into account (26%). 
                                                 
13
 Only the most theoretically and empirically interesting models are included in Table 4 (above). See appendix 4 
for the remaining models. 
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Table 3: Prais-Winsten regression model (AR1 & PCSE) – DV: Assigned refugees/10000 
inhabitants (log)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share of SD seats 0.00862     0.0264* 
 (0.0130)     (0.0141) 
       
Balance of power (SD)  -0.261***    -0.359*** 
  (0.0677)    (0.0781) 
       
Organizational capacity   0.0120   0.0147* 
   (0.00852)   (0.00807) 
       
Toughness (left coalition)    0.00513  0.00486* 
    (0.00316)  (0.00266) 
       
Toughness (right      -0.00953*** -0.0108*** 
coalition)     (0.00294) (0.00319) 
       
Unemployment rate 0.0527* 0.0532* 0.0532* 0.0494* 0.0509* 0.0497* 
 (0.0280) (0.0290) (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0260) 
       
Share of population with  -0.00993*** -0.00835** -0.00938** -0.0105** -0.00680 -0.00957** 
foreign background (0.00367) (0.00414) (0.00419) (0.00426) (0.00456) (0.00423) 
       
Share of free apartments 0.0177 0.0135 0.0166 0.0162 0.0176 0.0200 
 (0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0166) 
       
Population (log) -0.174*** -0.164*** -0.184*** -0.155*** -0.194*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0373) (0.0368) (0.0432) (0.0382) (0.0398) 
       
Self-residence refugees 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 
(log) (0.0541) (0.0535) (0.0538) (0.0542) (0.0525) (0.0516) 
       
Gini-coefficient -1.731 -1.496 -1.668 -1.707 -1.279 -0.796 
 (1.191) (1.248) (1.207) (1.227) (1.299) (1.230) 
       
Average income (log) -0.249 -0.401 -0.184 -0.212 -0.398 -0.414 
 (0.441) (0.469) (0.462) (0.460) (0.474) (0.446) 
       
Constant 4.942** 5.631** 4.656* 4.451* 6.206** 5.962** 
 (2.301) (2.432) (2.389) (2.484) (2.515) (2.407) 
Unit dummies No No No No No No 
Observations (n) 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 
R2 0.139 0.143 0.139   0.140 0.145 0.157 
Comments: , 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), 
Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority 
(2014). 
 
The effect of the toughness of right-wing representatives is about a 1 % decrease 
in assigned refugee reception per 1% increase in the independent variable, 
toughness (right-wing coalition) towards refugee reception in the municipality. 
 
The variable measuring the share of SD seats is positively correlated with the 
dependent variable, according to model 6. As the SDs proportional representation 
increases, the percent of assigned refugees increase with it. A 1% increase in SD 
representation equals 2.7% increase in assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants. 
 
A similarly surprising result presented in table 3 is the variable measuring 
organizational capacity a larger local organization translates into higher level of 
assigned refugee reception, 1% increase in the independent variable 
(organizational capacity) equates to 1.5% increase in the dependent variable, as 
seen in model 6. 
 
 30 
 
The toughness of left-wing coalition representatives does not have a negative 
impact on assigned refugee reception; in fact a tougher stance translates into 
increased assigned refugee reception (model 4 and 6). 
In terms of the control variables table 3 presents that unemployment rate is 
positively correlated to the dependent variable. Theoretically this could be 
understood as poorer municipalities (with higher unemployment) are more 
inclined to accept refugees in order to be benefit from the various national 
subsidies connected to refugee reception (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).  
 
Share of population with foreign background is negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable; a higher share of the population with a foreign background 
translates into less assigned refugees (model 6). But self-residence refugee 
reception is positively correlated with the dependent variable.  Combined this can 
be interpreted as; municipalities which have a lower total share of inhabitants with 
a foreign background but a higher share of self-residence refugee receptions are 
inclined to accept assigned refugees. This could be explained by the fact that if a 
municipality is inhabited by a large share of self-residence refugees they have the 
instruments and institutions (social services etc.) already in place and can thus 
accept more assigned refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).  
 
Last of the significant control variables is the one measuring population. 
Municipalities with a smaller population are more inclined to accept Self-
residence refugees. This result is confirmed in table 3 and the variable has 
remained significant throughout the statistical analysis.  
 
4.4 Revisiting the hypotheses 
The first hypothesis, H1, is connected to the organizational theoretical framework 
claiming that the success of the radical right is dependent on their capability to 
supply a well-functioning organization (Akkerman and de Lange 2013; Art 2011). 
The variable measuring the number of names on the SDs ballot paper divided by 
the number of total seats in the municipal council was predicted to have a negative 
effect on the dependent variable, the actual empirical results presented in this 
paper shows no effect or a reversed effect. H1 finds no support in this study.  
 
The theoretical framework supporting the organizational argument is strong and 
should be included into studies of this nature in the future. The total lack of 
support in this study could be due to the nature of the variable used in this paper. 
The variable “Organizational capacity” only captures the quantity of the local 
organization during one period of office. Art (2011) argues that not only the 
quantity of the organization should be taken into account, but also the quality. In 
order to capture the quality of the local organization two options seem appropriate 
to utilize as proxies. First, in Sweden every candidate on the ballot paper for any 
party specifies their occupation. This could be used as information on the 
candidates’ level of education and presumed socio-economic status. Theory claims 
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that when the radical right can attract representatives with a high socio-economic 
status their chance of success increases (Art 2011). Second, in order to capture the 
consistency of the local organization it is possible to compare the ballot papers in 
the same municipalities over time. This would make it possible to capture the 
consistency of the local representatives and thus local organization. Summa 
summarum, even though the supply-driven theoretical framework did not find any 
support in this study the theoretical arguments are strong and should be revisited 
in other studies. 
 
The hypothesis examining the institutional opportunity structure balance of power, 
H2, found strong support in this study. The “Beck-Katz” standard model showed 
that the level of assigned refugees decreased by about 17% in municipalities 
where the SD held the balance of power in the municipal council (see table 1). 
Using an arguably more accurate statistical model (Prais-Winsten regression) the 
effect was increased to 31% (see table 3). The theoretically anchored predictions 
deemed that three scenarios were likely to occur when the SD hold balance of 
power. First, the mainstream parties can, if the SD holds the balance of power, 
choose to cooperate in a grand coalition in order to nullify the potential power the 
SD gains from this institutional opportunity structure (a so-called cordon 
sanitaire). Second, the SD can cooperate with either one of the sides in order to 
gain influence of policy. This could lead to a decision favored by the SD (i.e. less 
assigned refugees). Third, the mere party competitive pressure by the existence of 
an active radical right party in the balance of power position can force mainstream 
parties to co-opt their policies in a verrechtsing manner, thus gaining SD indirect 
policy impact. The evidence presented in this thesis does not support the 
formation of a successful cordon sanitare in municipal councils when the SD 
holds balance of power, a conclusion which is supported by Loxbo (2010). SD is 
thus given direct or indirect or direct policy impact by either collaboration or co-
optation. Needless to say; the balance of power position increases the power and 
potential of SD in many shapes and forms, policy impact is one of them. 
 
The empirical analysis in this thesis found no significant negative correlation 
between assigned refugee reception and the share of SD seats. A similar result was 
found in the only other study looking at roughly the same relationship (Bolin et.al. 
2014). The size of the SD does not matter; they need to obtain the balance of 
power in order to have policy impact in the question of refugee reception. But 
does their size affect the policy impact when they hold the balance of power? In 
order to answer this question a multiplicative interaction model can be used 
(Brambor et.al. 2006; Berry et.al. 2012). By utilizing this method the two 
independent variables (Balance of power SD & Share of SD seats) are multiplied 
in a Prais-Winsten regression, chart (5) illustrates how the effect of the balance of 
power position on the dependent variable is changing with regards to the SD’s seat  
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Chart 6: Marginal effect of Balance of power (SD) on (DV) Assigned 
refugees/10000 inhabitants 
 
Comments: Dotted lines show the confidence intervals (95%). For a table displaying the results see 
Appendix 5 (model 2), the results are significant. Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), 
Statistics Sweden (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014).  
 
share, the so-called marginal effect.
14
 At 3% (roughly the mean of the variable, see 
appendix 1) of the total seats in the municipal council, the level of assigned 
refugees is decreased with about 15% when they hold the balance of power. When 
the SD has 15% of the seat share, the decrease is 35%. To summarize, in contrast 
to previous research (Bolin et. al. 2014) the result of this thesis concludes that the 
seat share of the SD matter in terms of policy impact when they hold the balance 
of power. 
 
In the case of the last hypothesis, H3, which analysis how the attitudes towards 
refugee reception of right-wing party local representatives affect the level of 
refugee reception the empirical analysis found interesting results. The theoretical 
prediction stated that a tougher stance on refugee reception among mainstream 
party officials would result in fewer assigned refugees received in the municipality 
(Bolin et al. 2014; Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). Contrary to the other study on 
this subject this thesis distinguishes between the two opposite coalitions in 
Sweden, right-wing and left-wing. The statistical analysis presents a conclusive 
result that shows that the views of the mainstream coalition representatives matter 
                                                 
14
 The reason the chart is displayed instead of the table is due to the fact that the table only reports the marginal 
effect (and corresponding standard errors) of X (Balance of power (SD)) when the conditional variable Z (Share 
of SD seats) is 0. Using a chart allows for presentation in a more readable format (Brambor et.al. 2006). 
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in terms of effect on level of assigned refugees in Swedish municipalities but 
different ways. If left-wing local representatives have tough attitude towards 
refugee reception it has no effect (table 1 & 2) or a positive effect (“Prais-
Winsten”, table 3) on assigned refugee reception. In the case of a right-wing 
politician the results are quite different. If right-wing representatives have a tough 
view on refugee reception the actual number of assigned refugees received in the 
municipality decreases (table 1, 2 & 3). Theoretically this result gives us reason to 
believe this is caused by co-optation of policy by the right-wing parties (Bale 
2008). There is a way to further examine this in a very simple but effective way. 
This study and other have shown that SD’s potential policy impact is to large 
extent dependent on whether or not they hold the balance of power (Bolin et al. 
2014; Loxbo 2010). Chart 6 below demonstrates that in municipalities where the 
SD holds the balance of power mainstream party officials are generally tougher on 
refugee reception in their municipality. 
 
Chart 6: Toughness towards refugee among mainstream party representatives’ 
reception & balance of power (SD) 
 
Comments: Y-axis: Toughness towards refugee reception, X-axis: SD balance of power. Sources: 
Swedish Election Authorities (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010). 
 
Chart 6 indicates that the SD have influenced mainstream party repreentatives to 
adopt a tougher views on refugee reception in municpalites where they hold 
balance of power. This would be indirect policy influence by the SD as a the 
empircal analyiss showed that the level of assigned refugees decreases if right-
wing party offcials have a tougher view on refugee reception. The above chart 
does not measure the change across time (due to data availability) and as more 
data becomes avaible the relationship should be further examined. 
15
  
 
The result presented in this thesis indicate that the SD have had direct (through 
collaboration) or indirect (co-optation)  policy impact in municipalties where they 
                                                 
15
 The survey measuring the party representatives’ attitude towards immigration (KOLFU) was conducted in 
2008. KOLFU2 was conducted in 2012 and allows for a future study in the matter; unfortunately this survey data 
is to be made available to external researchers in the spring of 2015 and can thus not be included in this thesis. 
15
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hold the balance of power. In terms of the opportunity structure created by tough 
view on refugee reception by right-wing party representatives, there is reason to 
belive that the SD have caused especially right-wing party officials to sway 
towards a tougher attitude towards immigration and by doing so  gaining indirect 
policy impact and reducing assigned refugee reception.  
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis has studied whether or not the SD has had any policy impact in the 
question of local assigned refugee reception. The results presented by the 
statistical analysis are conclusive; the SD has affected the number of assigned 
refugees accepted by Swedish municipalities. Two of the three hypotheses found 
support in the statistical. 
 
No support was found for the hypothesis related to organizational capacity of the 
SD. I believe that this relationship should be studied further as the theoretical 
framework supporting this argument is strong (Art 2011). The hypothesis related 
to the balance of power position found strong support in this thesis. In addition to 
adding to the existing knowledge on the power granted by this institutional 
opportunity structure (Bolin et al. 2014; Loxbo 2010), the evidence from this 
thesis suggest that the size of the SD matters, in terms of policy influence, when 
they hold the balance of power and that mainstream party members tend to have a 
tougher view on refugee reception in these municipalities. The change in attitude 
is especially interesting due to the results related to the third hypothesis. These 
results support the hypothesis stating that when right-wing politicians have a 
tougher view on refugee reception, the number of assigned refugees decreases. In 
other words, SD has indirect policy impact through co-optation by right-wing 
parties.  
 
As aforementioned, this study cannot determine if the SD has any direct policy 
impact through collaboration with mainstream parties. More studies are needed in 
order to determine the causal mechanism behind the relationship supported by the 
evidence in this thesis. Qualitative methods such as case studies should be 
conducted in order to determine how the SD gains policy impact in the municipal 
councils. Furthermore, as time goes on and more data accumulates more statistical 
analysis should examine this research question. 
 
In regards to the generalizability of the results a few things need to be taken into 
account. First, there is a difference between local and national governments. I.e. 
Swedish municipalities have a formal executive (kommunstyrelse) that is 
composed by members of all parties this probably alters the dynamics and 
competition among parties which distinguishes it from national politics (Loxbo 
2010: 302; Bolin 2014 et al). Despite the possible differences the result support by 
this and other similar studies (Bolin et. al. 2014) should be further tested in other 
contexts. Local politics in Sweden presents a unique opportunity to study the 
policy impact of the radical right using large n-analysis, the causal relationships 
discovered due to this should be further analyzed and developed. 
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In terms of empirical implications of the results of this study there are a few things 
that come to mind. First, this study used data from the two preceding terms of 
office and the SD has grown since then, thus gaining the balance of power 
position in twice as many municipalities (Ekman et al. 2014). In addition, over 
20000 expected assigned refugees with residence permits are thought to be in need 
of accommodation by the end of next year (2015), a decision taken by the 
municipal councils (Swedish Migration Board 2014). In the seven year period 
studied in this thesis the SD affected policy, if they continue to exert the same 
impact the coming term of office it will be an almost impossible task to 
accommodate all the assigned refugees. Furthermore, the events that took place in 
the national arena following the 2014 election showed that the SD is not going to 
be bystanders this coming term of office. 
.     
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Minimum Maximum Source Years covered 
Assigned refugees per  1.88 0.99 2030 0 4.67 Swedish Migration Board (2014) 2007-2013 
10000 inhabitants (log)        
        
Share of SD seats 3.15 3.56 2030 0 23.53 Statistics Sweden (2014),  2007-2013 
      Swedish Election Authority (2014)  
        
Balance of power (SD) 0.11 0.32 2030 0 1 Swedish Election Authority (2014); 2007-2013 
      Loxbo (2010)  
        
Organizational capacity 0.62 3.09 2030 0 49.23 Swedish Election Authority (2014) 2007-2013 
        
        
Toughness (left coalition) 25.25 10.58 2030 0 71.43 Giljam et.al (2010) 2008 
        
        
Toughness (right  41.36 11.06 2030 0 83.33 Giljam et.al (2010) 2008 
coalition)        
        
Unemployment rate 5.78 2.27 2030 0.95 14.33 Statistcs Sweden (2014) 2007-2013 
        
        
Share of population with  13.63 7.54 2030 3.77 55.76 Statistics Sweden (2014) 2007-2013 
foreign background        
        
Share of free apartments 2.27 2.87 1987 0 21.20 Statistics Sweden (2014) 2007-2013* 
        
        
Population (log) 9.82 0.94 2030 7.79 13.71 Statistics Sweden (2014) 2007-2013 
        
        
Self-residence refugees 2.26 1.15 2030 1.58 5.70 Swedish Migration Board (2014) 2007-2013 
per 10000 inhabitants 
(log) 
       
        
Gini-coefficient 0.31 0.04 1740 0.24 0.60 Statistics Sweden (2014);  2007-2012 
      KOLADA (2014)  
        
Average income (log) 5.48 0.12 1740 5.26 6.20 Statistics Sweden (2014) 2007-2012 
        
        
Lagged dependent 
varaibale (t-1) 
1.87 1.05 2030 0.00 2.64 Statistics Sweden (2014) 2006-2012 
        
Note: Annual survey from 2007-2009, biennial from 2010.  
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Appendix 2: Multiple regression 2007-2010 averages - DV: Assigned refugees/1000 inhabitants 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share of SD seats -0.00958     -0.00451 
 (0.0156)     (0.0223) 
Balance of power (SD)  -0.187    -0.168 
  (0.129)    (0.145) 
Organizational capacity   -0.000945   0.00129 
   (0.00602)   (0.00772) 
Toughness (left coalition)    -0.00618  -0.00908** 
    (0.00419)  (0.00453) 
Toughness (right coalition)     0.00594 0.00694* 
     (0.00383) (0.00412) 
Unemployment rate -0.0776** -0.0770** -0.0777** -0.0802** -0.0784** -0.0804** 
 (0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0345) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0343) 
Share of population with  -0.00479 -0.00488 -0.00523 -0.00808 -0.00250 -0.00555 
foreign background (0.00638) (0.00630) (0.00635) (0.00657) (0.00655) (0.00669) 
Share of free apartments 0.0343** 0.0332** 0.0351** 0.0348** 0.0350** 0.0323** 
 (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0162) 
Population (log) -0.212*** -0.209*** -0.214*** -0.212*** -0.219*** -0.209*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0554) (0.0568) (0.0553) (0.0552) (0.0568) 
Self-residence refugees 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.210*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0316) (0.0323) 
Gini-coefficient 0.0736 0.169 0.0132 0.359 0.319 1.161 
 (1.819) (1.808) (1.861) (1.823) (1.817) (1.912) 
Average income (log) -0.00444** -0.00459** -0.00423** -0.00362* -0.00477** -0.00449** 
 (0.00206) (0.00203) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00208) 
Constant 4.050*** 4.021*** 4.015*** 4.227*** 3.735*** 3.977*** 
 (0.664) (0.662) (0.686) (0.674) (0.691) (3.66) 
Adjusted r2 0.316 0.320 0.315 0.320 0.321 0.3364 
N 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Comments:  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01  
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Appendix 3: Multiple regression 2011-2013 averages - DV: Assigned refugees/1000 inhabitants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share of SD seats -0.0489***     -0.0544*** 
 (0.0135)     (0.0198) 
Balance of power (SD)  -0.371***    -0.234 
  (0.135)    (0.151) 
Organizational capacity   -0.00748   0.0108 
   (0.00510)   (0.00688) 
Toughness (left coalition)    0.00500  -0.00186 
    (0.00455)  (0.00478) 
Toughness (right coalition)     0.00919** 0.00518 
     (0.00409) (0.00431) 
Unemployment rate 0.0592* 0.0551* 0.0508 0.0481 0.0538* 0.0611* 
 (0.0313) (0.0316) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0318) (0.0319) 
Share of population with  -0.00579 -0.00864 -0.00826 -0.00797 -0.00606 -0.00546 
foreign background (0.00645) (0.00643) (0.00657) (0.00672) (0.00666) (0.00671) 
Share of free apartments 0.0689*** 0.0747*** 0.0758*** 0.0793*** 0.0778*** 0.0692*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0213) 
Population (log) -0.323*** -0.336*** -0.313*** -0.341*** -0.345*** -0.358*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0586) (0.0613) (0.0595) (0.0590) (0.0614) 
Self-residence refugees 0.115*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0265) 
Gini-coefficient -1.345 -1.340 -1.434 -2.225 -1.348 -1.173 
 (1.672) (1.694) (1.727) (1.724) (1.707) (1.753) 
Average income (log) -0.00125 -0.000571 -0.000552 -0.000215 -0.000440 -0.00110 
 (0.00197) (0.00197) (0.00202) (0.00199) (0.00198) (0.00198) 
Constant 4.540*** 4.361*** 4.196*** 4.227*** 3.830*** 4.582*** 
 (0.709) (0.716) (0.739) (0.745) (0.765) (0.812) 
Adjusted r2 0.475 0.465 0.455 0.453 0.460 0.478 
N 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Comments:  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01  
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Appendix 4: Time and unit dummies (full table) 
 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4) (5) (6a) (6b) 
Share of SD seats -0.0199** -0.0268*       -0.00977 -0.0234 
 (0.00873) (0.0156)       (0.00993) (0.0160) 
           
Balance of power (SD)   -0.230*** -0.188**     -0.217** -0.180** 
   (0.0822) (0.0882)     (0.0881) (0.0889) 
           
Organizational capacity     0.0177** 0.0115   0.0202** 0.0124 
     (0.00751) (0.00868)   (0.00789) (0.00872) 
           
Toughness (left coalition)       0.00574  0.00724* Omitted 
       (0.00393)  (0.00375)  
           
Toughness (right         -0.0105*** -0.00942** Omitted 
coalition)        (0.00389) (0.00406)  
           
Unemployment rate -0.0133 -0.0709* -0.0125 -0.0711* -0.0157 -0.0722* -0.0176 -0.0167 -0.0162 -0.0677* 
 (0.0237) (0.0405) (0.0236) (0.0403) (0.0238) (0.0405) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0405) 
           
Share of population with  -0.00854 0.0809 -0.00949* 0.0753 -0.0101* 0.0775 -0.0116** -0.00762 -0.00830 0.0925 
foreign background (0.00556) (0.0635) (0.00545) (0.0620) (0.00543) (0.0624) (0.00535) (0.00547) (0.00542) (0.0643) 
           
Share of free apartments 0.00812 -0.00399 0.00859 -0.00348 0.0113 -0.00306 0.0102 0.0114 0.0105 -0.00316 
 (0.0146) (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0186) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0185) 
           
Population (log) -0.144*** -10.64*** -0.145*** -10.80*** -0.160*** -10.35*** -0.133*** -0.176*** -0.142*** -10.27*** 
 (0.0479) (1.688) (0.0475) (1.681) (0.0477) (1.711) (0.0467) (0.0502) (0.0502) (1.711) 
           
Self-residence refugees 0.176*** 0.0790** 0.179*** 0.0815** 0.175*** 0.0768** 0.181*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.0765** 
(log) (0.0319) (0.0358) (0.0319) (0.0359) (0.0317) (0.0355) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0312) (0.0355) 
           
Gini-coefficient -0.721 -0.453 -0.609 -0.263 -0.966 -0.291 -0.827 -0.395 -0.303 -0.254 
 (1.067) (1.898) (1.061) (1.900) (1.081) (1.900) (1.069) (1.069) (1.058) (1.912) 
           
Average income (log) -1.551*** 3.230 -1.518*** 3.606 -1.365*** 3.754 -1.355*** -1.567*** -1.625*** 3.437 
 (0.412) (3.879) (0.403) (3.904) (0.410) (3.908) (0.403) (0.398) (0.396) (3.878) 
           
Constant 11.64*** - 11.43*** - 10.80*** - 10.36*** 12.35*** 12.07*** - 
 (2.109)  (2.059)  (2.098)  (2.050) (2.039) (2.022)  
Unit dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (n) 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 
R2 0.2022 0.118 0.2100 0.118 0.2020 0.117 0.2060 0.2134 0.2219 0.122 
Comments:  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, values replaced with “ – “ were omitted. 
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Appendix 5: Prais-Winsten regression (AR1, interactions) DV: Assigned 
refugees/10000 inhabitants (log) 
 (1) (2) 
Share of SD seats (when SD holds  -0.0344** -0.0360** 
balance of power) (0.0154) (0.0162) 
Share of SD seats (when SD does  0.0311** 0.0364** 
not hold balance of power) (0.0151) (0.0164) 
Balance of power (SD) -0.139* -0.138* 
 (0.0842) (0.0786) 
Organizational capacity  0.0141* 
  (0.00786) 
Toughness (left coalition)  0.00517* 
  (0.00267) 
Toughness (right coalition)  -0.0109*** 
  (0.00321) 
Unemployment rate 0.0492* 0.0494* 
 (0.0261) (0.0253) 
Average income (log) -0.427 -0.433 
 (0.408) (0.427) 
Population (log) -0.166*** -0.186*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0396) 
Share of population with  -0.0102*** -0.00964** 
foreign background (0.00343) (0.00413) 
Share of free apartments 0.0168 0.0200 
 (0.0168) (0.0162) 
Self-residence refugees 0.159*** 0.151*** 
 (0.0535) (0.0517) 
Gini-coefficient -1.330 -0.710 
 (1.173) (1.233) 
Constant 5.691*** 6.020*** 
 (2.122) (2.315) 
𝑅2 0.148 0.159 
N 1697 1697 
Comments:  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), Statistics 
Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014). 
 
 
 
 
